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desired. A review of Maryland law offers no basis for a court changing
the limitations on the measure of damages set in Coughlan and Mahone.
The common law was adopted by the General Assembly and must be
overridden by the General Assembly.' ' Use of judicial fiat for this
purpose as was done in Barrett bodes more mischief.
Stephen M. Hearne
57. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-INCREASE OR DECREASE OF PERMA-
NENT ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT-GRANTED WITHOUT
THE NECESSITY OF SHOWING A CHANGE IN THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF BOTH PARTIES. LOTT V. LOTT, 17 Md. App. 440,
302 A.2d 666 (1973).
In Lott v. Lott ' the Court of Special Appeals held that a substantial
change in the circumstances of both parties is not necessary for the
modification of alimony or child support. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed an increase in these payments which would correspond to the
husband's increase in income since the original award. This modifica-
tion was granted despite the petitioner-wife's concession that her needs
had not changed since the time of the divorce 2 and the husband's
assertion that a substantial change in the circumstances of both parties
must be shown.3 The determination that the husband's increase in
income after divorce4 may in itself justify a modification of alimony
and child support reflects the unusually broad discretion which the
Maryland courts of equity apply to alimony awards and to subsequent
modifications.
Dr. and Mrs. Lott entered the "oft recurring phase of the war of the
sexes - the primeval struggle for division of the husband's produc-
tivity after the couple have [sic] separated" 5 in 1970 when the peti-
1. 17 Md. App. 440, 302 A.2d 666 (1973).
2. Id. at 443, 302 A.2d at 668.
3. Id. at 442, 302 A.2d at 668.
4. The Lott's were divorced in 1970. They were married in 1952, after which Mrs. Lott worked
to put her husband through medical school. In 1968, upon Mrs. Lott's refusal to grant her
husband a divorce, he left Maryland and went west with his paramour. He returned to
Maryland nine months later with his companion and a child of their adultery. In his
absence, the $65,000 home previously shared by the Lotts was lost in a foreclosure sale and
Mrs. Lott moved to a modest apartment. She was forced to gain employment in order to
maintain herself and her son. After the final divorce was granted in 1970, Dr. Lott married
his paramour and, due to alimony payments, supported his wife and the three children in
addition to his previous wife and their only child.
Factors considered in the original award of alimony were: the sacrifices of the working
wife while her husband attended medical school, the adultery of the husband and the wife's
right to be supported in a life style to which she had become accustomed during the mar-
riage. Id. at 442-43, 302 A.2d at 668.
5. Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475, 164 A.2d 877 (1960).
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tioner-wife was awarded a divorce a vinculo and the husband was
directed to make monthly alimony and child support payments of
$450.6 On a subsequent petition by the wife the amount allocated for
child support was augmented by $40 weekly payments to cover the
cost of remedial tutoring for the son. Approximately one year after the
original decree, the wife again petitioned the trial court for further
modication. The request was granted and a modification order directed
an increase from $250 to $322.50 for alimony and an increase from
$200 to $266 for monthly child support.' The weekly $40 payments
for tutoring services remained unchanged. This substantial increase
awarded by the lower court was affirmed despite the appellate court's
recognition of two important facts: 1) there had been no change in the
pecuniary needs of the wife since the date of the original award, and 2)
the husband had undertaken the financial burdens of remarriage and
the support of an additional three children. His increase in salary of
approximately one-third was the prevailing factor in the court's deter-
mination that a substantial change in circumstance existed8 and a
corresponding increase in payments was therefore affirmed as a reason-
able modification of the original award.9
Although this reasoning appears inconsistent with another recent
decision which cbnstrues the wife's "need" in more literal terms,' 0 the
Maryland courts of equity have traditionally established and retained
exceptionally broad discretion in the alteration of an original award of
alimony.' ' This discretion is based upon the premise that in the award
of alimony, unlike any other area of chancery, "the need is more
compelling to tailor the remedy to the facts of each particular case."' 2
The courts therefore retain equity jurisdiction after the original award
and may, upon petition by either party, change the allowance if there
has been a sufficient intervening cause since the original decree.' 3 The
controlling factors in subjecting the decree to continuing review are
usually a change in the husband's financial ability to pay and a change
6. 17 Md. App. at 441, 302 A.2d at 667.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 449, 302 A.2d at 670.
9. Id. at 451, 302 A.2d at 672. In affirming the decision to grant the wife alimony payments
which corresponded to the husband's augmented income, the court did not establish any
limit that would preclude future increases that might be based on any further prosperity
which the husband may attain. Inferentially, the wife can petition the court for a
modification whenever the husband increases his wealth.
10. Although excerpts of Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 276 A.2d 425 (1971) are cited by
the Lott court, the following contrasting view was expressed in the Quinn opinion:
It is an allowance to the wife in recognition of the husband's common law
liability to support her; it is an allowance of money payable at stated periods by the
husband to the wife for her support during their joint lives so long as they live apart.
In other words, the sole object of the alimony award is to provide an allowance to the
wife for food, clothing, habitation and other necessities.
Id. at 643, 276 A.2d at 427 (citations omitted).
11. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 261 A.2d 452 (1970).
12. Eberly v. Eberly, 12 Md. App. 117, 126, 278 A.2d 107, 112 (1970).
13. Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 345, 125 A. 695, 697 (1924).
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in the wife's pecuniary needs.'" Such a change in circumstances must
be substantial' s and may be mollified or strengthened by other fac-
tors' 6 which have developed since the original award. 7 Although the
court may not relitigate the circumstances which determined the per-
manent alimony,' 8 the same criteria are frequently applied to a subse-
quent petition for modification.' ' The criteria were expressed in
Timanus v. Timanus2 0 and are as follows:
In determining an award of alimony and whether "the wife's
income is sufficient to care for her needs," the court shall
consider the husband's wealth and earning capacity, the station
in life of the parties, age, physical condition, the ability to
work, the length of time the parties have lived together, the
circumstances leading up to the divorce, and the fault which
destroyed the home.2
In the application of these parameters the equity courts frequently
reiterate the accepted interpretation of alimony as an equitable as-
surance of continued financial support for the wife which is not
intended as a punitive measure against the husband.2 2 Even though the
wife's need is the underlying premise of this criteria, many court
decisions appear to attach greater significance to the changed income
and overall financial status of the husband when the original fault was
his. 2 3 This trend has been further extended by the Lott court's award
of increased payments based solely upon the husband's augmented
income despite the wife's admission that her financial needs had not
increased since the date of the original decree. 2 '
The emphasis which the courts of equity have placed upon changed
circumstances of the parties in the modification of alimony is generally
based upon one of three variations. In Langrall v. Langrall2" while
giving consideration to all circumstances that might suggest a need for
modification, the court based their final determination on the wife's
change in financial need.2 6 Other cases give equal weight to all relevant
14. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 261 A.2d 452 (1970); Mays v. Mays, 232 Md. 120,
192 A.2d 80 (1963); Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 112 A.2d 466 (1954).
15. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171 (1969); Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340,
125 A. 695 (1924).
16. See p. 331-32 infra.
17. Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, 257 Md. 672, 264 A.2d 847 (1970); Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md.
489, 154 A.2d 914 (1940).
18. Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374. 140 A.2d 649 (1958).
19. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 276 A.2d 425 (1971); Danziger v. Danziger, 208 Md. 469,
118 A.2d 653 (1955).
20. 178 Md. 640, 16 A.2d 918 (1940).
21. Id. at 642, 16 A.2d at 920.
22. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 643, 276 A.2d 425, 427 (1971).
23. Eberly v. Eberly, 12 Md. App. 117, 278 A.2d 107 (1970); Warren v. Warren. 218 Md. 212,
146 A.2d 34 (1958); Danziger v. Danziger, 208 Md. 469, 118 A.2d 653 (1955).
24. 17 Md. App. 440, 443, 302 A.2d 666, 669 (1973).
25. 145 Md. 340, 125 A. 695 (1924).
26. Id. at 343, 125 A. at 697.
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changes in the financial status of both parties and consider the needs of
the wife as only one of several considerations.2 7 This View seeks to
balance the overall financial status of the husband with the living
expenses of the wife, as in Quinn v. Quinn.2 8 The Lott court further
diminishes the importance of the financial needs of the wife by award-
ing a modification solely upon the increased income of the husband.2 "
The apparent inconsistency in these three views is justified by the
repeated assertions that a court of equity must apply the same un-
usually broad discretion to a modification that is applied in the award
of the original decree.3 0
Despite the frequent use of the guidelines expressed by the Timanus
court3 ' and restated in later decisions, other courts have suggested a
different standard by which to view the relative circumstances of the
parties.3 2 In Winhel v. Winke13 3 the court formulated a "doctrine of
relative adjustment to contemporaneous faculties:" 3"
[T]his doctrine of relative adjustment to contemporaneous
faculties rests upon the mutual rights and obligations of the
parties which they assumed for the duration of their joint lives,
as well with reference to their children as to themselves. A
responsibility of the husband is the support and maintenance of
his wife and children in the measure of his ability and station in
life. The duties and rights in these respects are subject to
changes which are not foreseeable, and so cannot be adequately
anticipated and taken care of by judicial decree .... The obliga-
tions must be correspondingly fulfulled out of the husband's
contemporaneous faculties whether in wealth, in moderate
means, or in poverty. Within the gamut of fortune the wife
shares. From the nature of affairs, change in tangible property
and in income and in earnings may occur as well after as before
the separation of spouses.
3 -
Because this "doctrine" interprets the support of the wife as a
continuing obligation that is to be measured by the varying financial
status of the husband, the Lott decision cited the reasoning with
27. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 276 A.2d 425 (1971); see Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509,
112 A.2d 466 (1954); Tome v. Tome, 180 Md. 31, 22 A.2d 549 (1941).
28. 11 Md. App. 638, 651, 276 A.2d 425, 432 (1971).
29. 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A.2d at 670.
30. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 276 A.2d 425 (1971).
31. Eberly v. Eberly, 12 Md. App. 117, 278 A.2d 107 (1971); Sanborn v. Sanborn, 256 Md. 178,
259 A.2d 511 (1969); Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948).
32. An example is the "one-third rule" of awarding the wife one-third of the husband's income
as alimony. Schuman v. Schuman, 252 Md. 13, 248 A.2d 876 (1969); Bradshaw v.
Bradshaw, 189 Md. 322, 55 A.2d 719 (1947). Although no such standard was expressly
stated by the Lott court, the original award and the increase each amounted to a one-third
portion of Dr. Lott's income. 17 Md. App. at 450, 302 A.2d at 672.
33. 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914 (1940).
34. Id. The Winkel court's use of the word "faculties" refers to the husband's financial ability
to pay alimony.
35. Id. at 499, 15 A.2d at 919 (emphasis added).
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approval. 3 6 The Lott court did not infer, however, that the contem-
poraneous faculties doctrine gives equal weight to Dr. Lott's remarriage
and his financial burden of three additional children. This is despite the
doctrine's suggestion that "the nature of affairs" encompasses more
than merely the earnings of the husband.3 I The increase in salary
which Dr. Lott enjoyed became the determining factor, and prompted
the court's conclusion that "[a] substantial increase in the husband's
income alone, can under appropriate circumstances, be legally sufficient
to justify an increase in the amount of alimony even though the wife's
needs continue as they existed at the time of the initial award." 3 A
change in the financial circumstances of the husband is thereby nar-
rowly construed as a change in income, a view that is inconsistent with
that of prior decisions, and with the position that all relevant circum-
stances should be evaluated when the court reviews the original
award.3 Although re-marriage is not in itself sufficient cause for a
xeduction in alimony payments to the first wife,4 it certainly affects
the financial status of the husband.
Rather than address itself at length to either the logic of increasing
alimony payments where the wife concedes that her needs have not
changed or to the relative effect of re-marriage on financial status, the
Lott court notes the wife's admission in a single sentence4 and
dismisses the effect of Dr. Lott's new burdens as circumstances pre-
viously considered by the lower court: "The chancellor's opinion spe-
cifically mentions these factors [the husband's remarriage and addi-
tional parental responsibilities], thereby showing that he did consider
them along with other pertinent matters."4 2 The decision relies heavily
on the settled law that remarriage does not in and of itself justify a
reduction4 of alimony but does not adequately explain its relevance
to a petition for the increase of payments.4 4 The main thrust of the
court's opinion was directed at the necessity to show only a substantial
change in the circumstances of either party and that a change in the
husband's income constituted such a change. This position has been
previously taken although never expressly stated.4 There are extenuat-
36. 17 Md. App. at 445, 302 A.2d at 69.
37. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
38. 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A.2d at 670.
39. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 276 A.2d 425 (1971); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 240 Md. 743,
215 A.2d 807 (1965); Danziger v. Danziger, 208 Md. 469, 118 A.2d 653 (1956).
40. Warren v. Warren, 218 Md. 212, 146 A.2d 34 (1958); Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 125
A. 695 (1924).
41. "It was conceded by the wife that her needs had not substantially changed since the date of
the original decree." 17 Md. App. at 443, 302 A.2d at 668.
42. Id. at 448, 302 A.2d at 671.
43. Chalkley v. Chalkley, 240 Md. 743, 215 A.2d 807 (1965); Warren v. Warren, 218 Md. 212,
146 A.2d 34 (1958).
44. Although the Lott court places little weight upon the husband's additional financial burden
of remarriage and considers an increase in his income alone as a sufficient ground for
modification, they quote with approval the following excerpt from Quinn: "The husband's
overall financial ability to support (and not merely his current income), and the wife's
need for support are controlling factors." 11 Md. App. at 643, 276 A.2d at 427.
45. Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. App. 489, 499, 15 A.2d 914, 919 (1940). The obligation of
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ing circumstances which may be encountered by one of the parties that
require modification of the decree; however, a change in the original
award for such a reason should be carefully scrutinized to assure a
continuing balance between the obligation of the husband and the need
of the wife.
The inequities of continuing an allocation based on the fortunes of
one party after the final divorce decree are noted by other jurisdic-
tions. In the Illinois case of Arnold v. Arnold4 6 the court refused to
modify the original award of alimony merely because of the husband's
subsequent increase in income.4 ' The wife did, however, receive an
increase which was based upon the rise in the cost of living from the
date of the original award. This modification was based upon the
premise that a wife's continuing support is to be determined by the
lifestyle to which she was accustomed at the time of the divorce and
not, as in Lott, by the changed fortunes of the husband.4 An increase
in the wife's cost of living would therefore require a modification of the
award. The Arnold court felt that any increase beyond this adjusted
maintenance would unfairly deprive the husband of any independent
prosperity he had been able to attain after the divorce.4 9 The Arnolds
were divorced during the Depression, when Mr. Arnold was earning
$7500 annually. Thereafter, he substantially improved his financial
position and at the time of petition for modification he had an annual
income of $70,000 and a net worth of over $1,000,000. The court
found that since the divorce of the parties was prior to the husband's
aquisition of wealth, the wife had no right to a proportionate share of
his augmented income.' 0
She cannot logically claim that because she was his wife
several years before good fortune came to him, she now has a
right to participate therein. By her own choice, she was not his
wife when he amassed his present wealth. The station in life to
which he has accustomed her was that existing in 1931 and
prior thereto. It is that station in life in which he is bound to
maintain her now, if he is financially able to do so.' '
This rationale focuses upon the primary intent of alimony, an obliga-
tion to support an estranged wife, not to endow her.' 2 The Lott court
alimony corresponds to the husband's ability to pay (his contemporaneous faculties)
without regard for a change in the wife's needs.
46. 332 I1. App. 586, 76 N.E.2d 335 (1947).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 588, 76 N.E.2d at 337.
49. Id. at 589, 76 N.E.2d at 338.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 588, 76 N.E.2d at 337.
52. Id.; cf. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 131, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969) (54% of husband's




has extended this fundamental premise to include an increased alimony
obligation despite a lack of need. Such a decision goes beyond the
maintenance and support of the wife.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Lott is a natural consequence of prior inconsistent
modifications of alimony by the Maryland appellate courts. The in-
compatibility of these decisions is continually rationalized as a neces-
sary result of the particular exigencies of litigation which require the
application of unusually broad discretion. While the chancellor's discre-
tion should not be usurped, there is a need for greater uniformity in
alimony modification. The husband's yoke of continuing support
should not be so burdened with the weight of uncertainty that the final
decree of alimony becomes a legal fiction. A modification that increases
payments beyond the former wife's needs and fails to consider the
added financial burdens of the husband is clearly excessive.
If the courts are unable to abide by the guidelines for alimony
awards already imposed by the legislature,' ' the guidelines should be
redefined. Such a clarification and perhaps even a change would seem
particularly appropriate at this time. More definite criteria should
reflect the changing attitudes towards the obligations of marriage.' 4
The husband is no longer looked upon as the sole provider; women have
sought and gained a significant position as productive wage earners, and
children are now seldom coddled in the confines of the family until
they reach the age of majority. With the sharp increase in the divorce
rate and the resulting frequency of modification hearings, there is a
pressing need to establish more uniform guidelines for maintaining
support. If the judiciary continues to avoid facing this duty through the
guise of broad judicial discretion, the legislature should redefine the
criteria.
The judiciary should not continue to emphasize flexibility at the
expense of an ascertainable standard that will obviate inconsistency.
If the Maryland appellate courts further the present confusion, under
the guise of discretion, the legislature should redefine the criteria to
ensure its proper application.
Rignal W. Baldwin
Leslie Winner
53. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 5(a) (1973) provides: "In all cases where alimony or alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees are claimed, the court shall not award such alimony or
counsel fees unless it shall appear from the evidence that the wife's income is insufficient
to care for her needs."
54. Although Maryland has adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, the appellate courts have
yet to determine its applicability to an alimony award or modification. MD. CONST.,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46, § 1.
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